When was resilience merged into risk reduction?

I am convinced that risk reduction as a community resilience concept was put firmly on the global map during the Tsunami operation in Indonesia with Pak Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, then Minister of Tsunami, driving it. 

I was proud that the New Zealand Government funded a global workshop on  'Promoting Initiatives on Disaster Risk Management' that embedded both concepts of risk reduction and resilience  as an integrated cross-cutting initiative to be a crucial part of all future disaster planning and recovery operations,  and was etched forever in the final tsunami report from all Governments: 

The Tsunami Legacy: Innovation Breakthroughs and Change

The Tsunami Legacy report, which Pak Kuntoro presented to Ban-Ki-moon, Bill Clinton and Helen Clarke (UNDP) in 2009 in New York is a brilliantly compiled booklet. I was fortunate to be there with fellow New Zealander Jerry Talbot also from IFRC.

The IFRC have since funded a practitioners toolkit on disaster recovery which will be launched soon in New York. 

If you want to read Tsunami Legacy click here

Pak Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (left) then Minister of Tsunami, and Bob McKerrow Head of Delegation IFRC Indonesia.

It is worth having a read of the Executive summary of this report to refresh yourself of what was learned from the Tsunami Operation.

In the years and months that have gone by since 

the devastating Indian Ocean Earthquake and 

Tsunami of December 2004, the affected 

communities – from Banda Aceh to Batticaloa, 

Puntland to Phang Nga, Noonu to Nagapattinam – 

have seen both tragedy and triumph. 

Tragedy, because the destructive power of the 

tsunami left countless communities without homes or 

livelihoods, eradicated key infrastructure in countries 

around the region, and irrevocably damaged large 

swaths of coastal area. In all, more than 228,000 

people – in 14 countries – perished as a result of the 

disaster. 

Triumph, because while the disaster wreaked havoc 

and devastation on the coastlines along the Indian 

Ocean rim, it also triggered an overwhelming national 

and international response, delivering emergency 

relief and recovery assistance through multiple 

partners, funds and programmes. Milestone successes 

have been collectively achieved in supporting affected 

communities to restore their lives and livelihoods, and 

to reconstruct their houses and settlements, all with 

care to empower future generations to thrive. 

Individual citizens, national governments and 

international financial institutions around the globe 

contributed funds to the recovery, resulting in an 

estimated US$13.5 billion in aid. 

With an operation of such unprecedented scope, a 

number of useful lessons have been learned across the 

recovery spectrum about what worked and what did 

not. To take stock of these collective and country specific findings,

 this report asks if those involved in this massive undertaking were able to achieve takes its cue from former UN Secretary-General Kofi 

Annan’s words – “it’s not enough to pick up the 

pieces. We must draw on every lesson we can to 

avoid such catastrophes in the future” – and from the 

call of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, 

President Bill Clinton, to “build back better.” 

“Who Stops to Think?’ The Challenges of 

Leadership and Coordination 

Both the destruction caused by – and the response to 

– the tsunami were unusual in terms of scale. The 

unique situation warranted intensive strategic 

coordination for the recovery to be effective as well as 

considerable pressure to deliver tangible results. 

Closest to the epicentre, the Indonesian Province of 

Aceh faced one of the most complex situations with a 

massive loss of life, extensive destruction of 

infrastructure, and an extraordinary influx of actors. 

In response, a dedicated body, the Aceh-Nias 

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), was 

set up in April 2005, with a 4-year mandate to 

coordinate all recovery activities as well as implement 

a number of government projects. 

Elsewhere, in Sri Lanka, the tsunami was a catalyst for 

creation of the Ministry of National Disaster 

Management and Human Rights in 2006. The 

Government of Maldives moved swiftly to set up a 

similar structure. On the same day as the tsunami, it 

created a National Disaster Management Centre 

(NDMC) to coordinate activities. 

This development of lead governance mechanisms for 

relief and recovery, tasked with coordinating 

ministries, donors, agencies, communities, women’s 

groups and others, and with building national and 

local capacities to manage the process, turned out to 

be a critical breakthrough in all these countries. 

Carefully connecting the local body to a broader, 

global coordinating infrastructure – as was done in 

Indonesia via the Global Consortium for Tsunami 

Recovery, the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) and the UN 

Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias 

meaningful development and reform. 

(UNORC) – was key to facilitating coordination in a 

complex recovery context involving countless 

international and national stakeholders. As new 

structures, void of institutional baggage, these 

agencies also benefited from the ability to be flexible 

and quickly adapt to local circumstances. 

In India, too, where no new body needed to be 

created, the government seized on the moment by 

devolving significant authority to local administrators, 

a crucial aspect to the Tamil Nadu recovery effort. A 

network of state- and district-level knowledge centres 

provided the infrastructure for disseminating vast 

amounts of information and reliable village-level data; 

it also became a focal point for NGOs on how they 

could contribute to recovery. The key to coordinating 

recovery here and elsewhere was maintaining speedy, 

flexible and accountable coordination systems and 

procedures, including at the local level. 

Recovery partners in Indonesia learned a similar 

lesson. By giving the coordination structure full 

authority and basing it ‘close to the action’ it was able 

to become more responsive to the local context. 

Importantly, BRR was given full authority to manage 

all aspects of the tsunami recovery in Aceh on behalf 

smoother coordination process, devoid of any 

potential inter-ministry politics. Significantly, BRR 

Headquarters was located in the capital of Aceh, and 

not in Jakarta. 

Flexibility and know-how, coupled with a culture of 

risk-taking, was a central aspect of BRR’s success and 

led to several important breakthroughs and 

innovations. These included the Tim Terpadu (a one 

stop shop for processing all visa, customs, tax and 

other clearance requirements for thousands of aid 

workers and equipment) and a mandatory Project 

Concept Note (PCN) format for all programmes, 

which helped avoid unnecessary duplication and 

ensured efficient use of funds. 

Similarly, when Maldives faced a shortfall of nearly 

US$100 million in recovery funds, a number of 

innovative partnership strategies were implemented 

to secure additional funding. The unique “Adopt-AnIsland” initiative implemented by UNDP, emerged as 

a particularly powerful marketing tool under which 

donor support could be matched directly to a specific 

project. By mid-2006, 44 percent of the US$41 

million that UNDP had raised was mobilised through 

Adopt-An-Island. In both cases the willingness to be 

opportunistic and take risks with “breakthrough 

initiatives” accelerated recovery and facilitated 

‘building back better’. 

In the final analysis, however, lack of local capacity 

has remained an issue, throughout. In the Maldives, 

the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) 

was set up to coordinate activities in a similar vein to 

BRR. But while the Centre took the lead in many 

aspects, being new to disaster management it relied 

on outside help to a significant degree. And in the 

future, it must be remembered that building local 

capacity is an important priority if the purpose-built 

recovery agency is temporary and the local 

Government is expected to sustain the gains in the 

long term. 

Seeing Those Who Are ‘Invisible’. Achieving 

Equity In Recovery 

While international codes and principles guide relief 

and recovery efforts, many tsunami affected 

communities were still unable to adequately access 

assistance immediately after the disaster because of 

barriers associated with their gender, ethnicity, age, 

class, religion or occupation. Often, tight deadlines 

imposed by the need to deliver fast had the effect of 

dropping equity issues – or of the wrong projects 

being taken up by the wrong organisations for the 

wrong reasons. 

Many people could not access assistance after disasters 

simply because of their gender, ethnicity, age, class, 

religion or occupation. In particular, it is women and 

the poorest whose needs tend to be overlooked. Yet 

the tsunami also provided an important opportunity to 

address underlying social inequities and strengthen 

human rights protection for vulnerable groups, a task 

quickly seized upon by India’s strong civil society and 

of the central government, which allowed for a much 

vibrant media. Combined with a state government in 11

Tamil Nadu that displayed swiftness, responsiveness 

and openness, this made the difference in bringing all 

survivors back on the road toward recovery much 

faster. 

As recovery actors in all five locales quickly realised, 

there could be no more business-as-usual when 

dealing with a disaster of such unusual proportions. 

Responding to the initial exclusion, they were quick 

to catch up in innovative ways, many employing a 

human rights perspective to create an enabling 

environment for participation. In India, the State 

openness to working with representatives of different 

social groups in addressing flaws stands out as 

particularly praiseworthy. Authorities in Tamil Nadu 

did not simply respond to practical needs but offered 

real opportunities for change, through several key 

steps. 

Breakthroughs in India included the implementation 

of disaster-resistant construction and the institution of 

inexpensive, 10-year housing insurance against all 

forms of disasters. Houses were built for indirectly 

affected families who were also given housing 

assistance and rights to land ownership. Women 

benefited from opportunities for strategic change in 

their status, such as joint housing rights for spouses 

and funds for the education and resettlement of 

orphaned adolescent girls and unmarried women, 

amongst other initiatives. 

Across the waters, in Sri Lanka, strong emphasis was 

placed on equity and the targeting of vulnerable 

groups after the tsunami, especially with regard to 

permanent housing, road building and highlighting of 

issues such as human rights, participation and the 

environment. Along these lines, a number of 

successful – and flexible – interventions were 

initiated, with many partners coming to see the 

importance of addressing conflict and post-conflict 

issues in the post-tsunami setting as a consequence. 

affected in permanent housing under its Unified 

Assistance Scheme or had their houses upgraded. 

Hallmarks of the scheme included clear eligibility 

criteria, management at local and provincial levels, 

and significant community involvement. 

For equity gains to be sustained it was necessary to 

anchor innovative practices in the institutional 

infrastructure of the recovery – good intentions can 

only do so much if systems are not in place to track 

and identify vulnerable groups. Rather than a 

piecemeal approach, then, countries succeeded best 

when there was a commitment from high-level 

managers to ensure equity. In India, a series of 

independent equity audits were carried out in 2005 

and 2006, at the request of local and international 

NGOs, by the Social Equity Audit Secretariat and 

trained auditors. The success of the audits is reflected 

in the fact that amongst some NGOs, the percentage 

of budget that went to directly support interventions 

for the excluded rose from 10 or 12 percent to 60 

percent. 

Building on women’s grassroots activism, recovery 

actors in Indonesia, among other things, sought to 

ensure that gender issues were considered in all 

development sectors through a special unit that 

formulated a comprehensive gender policy. UNIFEM 

placed a gender advisor in BRR to provide sustained 

input and guidance and BRR also employed genderspecific 

data for monitoring and evaluation, developed practical 

checklists for use in health, housing, education, livelihoods 

and institutional change, and promoted active participation 

of tsunami-affected women in plans for their future. 

Successes in India and Indonesia underscore the 

importance of developing institutional antidiscrimination
capacity by reviewing organisational culture and offering
 training to staff on rights-based approaches, including
awareness and understanding of gender-sensitive
international codes, guidelines and principles. 

Depending on the context, this was not always an easy 

goal to achieve across the board. In Sri Lanka and 

Aceh, both regions affected by conflict, there was a 

need to also address the victims of conflict as well as 

those of the tsunami. However, most post-tsunami 

organisations largely ignored the post-conflict 

context, in part due to donor-stipulated restrictions 

government’s timeliness, responsiveness and 

For example, the government resettled the conflict-12

on how they could use their funds. This led to 

numerous grievances raised by conflict-affected 

communities and perceptions of rising inequalities in 

aid provision. If conflict sensitivity had been more 

widespread and funds not restricted to tsunami 

victims only, building back better could have been 

more equitable all along. The provision of ”untied” 

donor funds that offer flexibility to modify assistance 

packages to suit local needs would have enabled more 

flexibility to address these issues in a straightforward 

manner. 

Creating a ‘Virtuous Loop’: Embracing People’s 

Participation 

While citizen participation is widely considered a 

cornerstone of democratic governance and efficient 

programming, too often those most in need after the 

tsunami were not seriously consulted about planning 

or implementation of relief and recovery. Concerted 

efforts were made in all countries affected by the 

disaster, however, to curb this initial trend. Perhaps 

the most valuable benefit of promoting participation 

was something that, in the end, is not easily 

quantifiable: a feeling of individual empowerment, of 

“ownership” of community resources, and the 

unleashing of people’s own capacities to cope. 

Efforts to overcome the lack of consultation were 

particularly successful in Sri Lanka, Maldives and 

Thailand, where recovery actors employed 

participation by both women and men, through 

extensive people’s consultations, beneficiary surveys, 

Help Desks and community monitoring of projects. 

The Government of Sri Lanka empowered the 

national Human Rights Commission to conduct 

people’s consultations in more than 1,100 tsunami
affected communities in 13 districts. Although it was 

not always easy to ensure community participation, in 

cases where participation was enforced, projects were 

more successful. 

As a result of the thousands of complaints received 

during the people’s consultations, United Nations 

could provide support to the Human Rights 

Commission in establishing Help Desks in each district 

to raise awareness among communities on their rights 

and entitlements and to follow up on grievances. 

In the Maldivian context, community consultations 

had rarely occurred before to the extent instituted 

after the tsunami. Beneficiary surveys deepened 

knowledge of important qualitative dimensions of 

recovery, increasing accountability to affected 

communities, and were hailed as “one of the most 

significant innovations of the tsunami response.” 

Thailand, too, made it a priority to give communities 

a strong voice. Local authorities took the lead in many 

reconstruction efforts and were supported to improve 

community consultation, including training to 

strengthen women’s leadership and decision making. 

One of the most successful such initiatives was the 

restoration of indigenous livelihoods in Koh Lanta, an 

island district of 30,000 in Krabi province. Taking 

into account the traditional livelihoods of the many 

ethnic groups on the island, the island was developed 

by community mobilisation, savings schemes, and 

cooperatives. 

Still, it was not always easy to ensure community 

participation, especially as some agencies and 

organisations sometimes tended to approach the issue 

with only limited enthusiasm. Many, it appears, 

tacked on consultations as a programmatic 

afterthought, and did not approach it as a key 

component of the project’s success. Indeed, several 

NGOs have acknowledged that mistakes could have 

been avoided if a more participatory approach had 

been used earlier on. Many had to readjust along the 

way to respond to realities and needs on the ground. 

A key requirement for these organisations was to 

decentralise authority within the organisation to the 

local levels. Both CARE and World Vision, for 

example, put their field offices in the driver’s seat, 

reasoning that they would be best able to deal with the 

needs and demands of the tsunami affected people. 

Some other NGOs, on the other hand, found it more 

difficult to implement effective participation since 

many key decisions were being made back in their 

headquarters, rather than in the field. 

Similarly, the success in the Maldives did not come 

easy. For one, it proved difficult to engage 

communities in disaster risk management awareness, 

given that many Maldivians saw the tsunami as a “one off”
event that would not recur. Critically, however, 

the Government and recovery partners were 

persistent, even translating basic disaster risk 

management terminology into the local Dhivehi 

language. 

Countering Corruption and Ensuring 

Accountability 

From the first days of the recovery, then, steps had to 

be taken to ensure anti-corruption and accountability 

would inform all levels of operations, starting with 

the institutions themselves. BRR set out to pay its 

employees competitive salaries to ensure that the best 

and brightest were not “poached” by international 

agencies – and, more importantly, to break a culture 

of gift-giving. 

To enable complete transparent access and tracking of 

all tsunami-related funds, BRR developed a 

comprehensive information management system, the 

Recovery Aceh-Nias Database (RAND). All agencies 

involved in tsunami recovery were required to 

register with BRR, set up an account on RAND and 

send regular updates on funds committed and 

disbursed. Complementing the process-based RAND, 

a “survey-based” Housing Geospatial Database (HGD) 

was created to provide a snapshot of recovery by 

verifying and digitally mapping the vast housing 

reconstruction sector. The HGD was recently merged 

with a third database, covering all other assets – 

bridges, hospitals, schools, roads, etc. – creating a 

combined information system which is one of the 

most comprehensive and “leak-proof” in the recovery 

spectrum. 

As Indonesia realised, however, good systems will not 

deliver ‘on their own’. Accountability mechanisms 

need to be client oriented. After being slow to get off 

the ground, international and national partners, and 

provincial and district governments were contacted to 

identify what types of analytical products, as well as 

what information and in which format, would be 

useful. Then, RAND changed accordingly – absorbing 

a major lesson in ensuring participation. 

A strong complaints mechanism is equally important. 

Early designation of grievance focal points and an 

adequate budget for grievance facilitation are critical 

for reporting of abuses and corruption, as is 

empowering affected communities, including the 

most vulnerable, in understanding and using these 

mechanisms. Affected people must be empowered to 

articulate community claims, actively monitor and 

evaluate reconstruction and make their own choices. 

Recovery data, however complex it may be, should be 

shared in layperson terms to the extent possible. 

In Sri Lanka the establishment of an effective 

complaint mechanism through local Help Desks (in 

response to input solicited in consultations) was a 

particular breakthrough. The public could here 

question eligibility for assistance, report potential 

cases of corruption, or file a complaint. By October 

2006, the DRMU had received 17,000 complaints and 

successfully resolved most. In addition, UNDP Sri 

Lanka set up an AidWatch initiative to enable 

communities to closely monitor projects. Such vital 

linkages contributed to increasing responsibility and 

accountability toward the community and laid 

groundwork for continued networking. 

Many organisations, notably BRR, responded to the 

threat of corruption by putting in place more 

With large amounts of cash and goods in motion, 

corruption is always a threat during a crisis. But despite 

the influx of billions of dollars in tsunami-affected 

countries, corruption levels across the board were 

kept remarkably low. Key to this success was a 

commitment to view corruption, not as a nuisance or 

unfortunate side effect of the recovery, but as a core 

threat to the reconstruction effort as a whole. In Aceh, 

where an unprecedented US$6.4 billion were pledged 

for recovery, Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the 

Director of BRR, urged the recovery community to set 

the bar high: “We see the fight against corruption in 

Aceh and Nias as advancing Indonesia’s wider struggle 

against corruption.” A punitive focus on “finding 

corruptors” would not be enough.

 To tackle graft and fraud, BRR became 

the first government agency to have an autonomous 

Anti-Corruption Unit (SAK) set up to work with 

other government institutions, international 

institutions like the World Bank, and civil society 

organisations such as Transparency International 

Indonesia in carrying out its primary objectives of 

prevention, investigation and education. Since its 

inception in September 2005, SAK has received 1,530 

confidential complaints. 

What if it Happens Again? Innovations in 

Disaster Risk Management 

The tsunami has precipitated a critical shift in the 

minds of policy makers and communities alike. It is no 

longer tenable to view disasters as isolated events and 

respond without taking into account the social and 

economic factors that aggravate the situation. The 

tsunami drew attention to the importance and 

urgency of reducing the enabling causes of disaster. In 

all tsunami-affected countries, a newfound enthusiasm 

for securing the country and community against future 

disasters has engendered the creation of disaster 

preparedness institutions and policies, new regional 

and national early warning systems, and concerted 

efforts at promoting community-based disaster 

awareness and preparedness at every turn. 

Critically, new disaster preparedness structures have 

been established in four out of the five tsunami affected 

countries and a regional tsunami early warning system has 

been operational since 2006, complementing the global 

commitment pledged by 168 governments to reduce 

multi-hazard risks and vulnerabilities under the Hyogo 

Framework for  Action 2005-2015. 

Thailand in particular has been a leader in numerous 

disaster risk management initiatives, and its early 

warning system is well-positioned to become a 

regional role model. Through ASEAN, the Thai 

government swiftly proposed a regional tsunami early 

warning centre that would coordinate with various 

nations’ early warning systems to ensure complementarity.
It established a Voluntary Trust Fund and donated
US$10 million in seed money to it; additional funding
came from donors such as Sweden. 

Thailand was also quick to create a ‘one-stop map 

server’, combining databases that previously could not 

be used together into one. This clearing house of 

information includes high-resolution satellite images, 

aerial photographs and base infrastructure maps, all 

available at the touch of a button in an emergency. 

Maldives’ first disaster risk profile, created after the 

tsunami and based on Geographic Information System 

mapping, represents another innovative approach to 

profile as a key source for development strategies to 

mitigate climate change and future disasters, 

particularly in developing a “Safer Islands” 

programme, which provides incentives for voluntary 

migration to safer islands. 

Sri Lanka, too, has come a long way in establishing 

comprehensive disaster management-related systems. 

Organised around 7 key themes, a “road map” has 

been developed, identifying over 100 investments to 

reduce disaster risk. Under it, numerous innovative 

initiatives have begun toward developing a multihazard 

approach for disaster management. In addition, the Disaster 

Management Act that had been under discussion for 

about a decade prior was passed in May 2005. 

Following intensive efforts by 29 governments around 

the Indian Ocean, a regional tsunami early warning 

system has been operational since 2006 as part of a 

coordination plan by UNESCO-Intergovernmental 

Oceanographic Commission. However, preparedness is 

not just about high-tech early warning systems. Community 

participation in disaster risk mitigation is also a necessity. 

Women, in particular, are well-placed to participate in risk 

assessments and the promotion of disaster risk reduction, 

ensuring consideration of gender-specific concerns. 

Training of a number of community leaders, teachers, local 

disaster managers and media personnel has demonstrated 

the use of response techniques. 

Even before the tsunami, large community-based 

disaster risk management programmes existed in 

vulnerable areas in countries such as India – where 

disaster management. The government has used the 

they have been credited for capacity strengthening in 

search and rescue, first and evacuation methods that 

resulted in saving countless lives during the disaster as 

Post-tsunami, excellent opportunities have been 

presented for deepening community disaster risk 

management across the region, setting up local and 

national partnerships. In Thailand, for example, the 

early warning system was taken to the local level, 

linked with loudspeakers in rural villages and with 

more than 100 warning towers along the coast. 

The tsunami, finally, brought an increased awareness 

on the importance of natural defence barriers. Healthy 

coastal ecosystems, such as mangroves, estuaries, 

wetlands and sandy beaches, are able to provide good 

protection against the force of tsunamis and storm 

surges and contribute to disaster risk reduction while 

providing diverse livelihoods, sufficient nutritious 

food, shelter and access to goods for communities. 

Several organisations and programmes, such as 

Mangroves for the Future, now focus on the 

humanitarian implications of failure to protect coastal 

ecosystems. But while most people are aware of the 

importance of resource-based industries such as 

ecotourism and fisheries to coastal economies, there is 

less comprehension of just how important these goods 

and raw materials are in terms of their multiplier 

effects nationally and locally. 

Will We Do Better Next Time? 

If another tsunami happened tomorrow, would the 

response from governments and the international 

community be stronger and better? Can we multiply 

our successes, learn from our shortfalls and apply this 

in the future for both emergency relief and longer term
recovery?
You only know lessons have really been learned when
 you stop thinking about them and simply do them. 

Particularly in light of the current global financial 

crisis, many believe that whatever innovations we 

think are replicable have to be at a low-cost level. 

Luckily, the most important lessons we have learned 

are not necessarily those that depend on the 

availability of large amounts of funding. Effective 

leadership and coordination, beginning at the 

development organisations alike, can go a long way in 

ensuring an efficient and sustainable recovery. And 

while coordination and leadership may be more easily 

talked about than put into practice, they remain 

particularly important in a disaster context where 

chaos goes hand in hand with calamity. 

respond to the voices of those most affected – 

including those normally not consulted, especially 

solving the leadership equation. The many delivery 

partners who make up the reconstruction community 

must also develop the quality and effectiveness of their 

leadership. 

We have learned that accountability and preparedness 

are critical, as is a willingness to take risks and embed 

institutional as well as cultural reform amid disaster 

response. This must include serious reflection and be 

a continuous process through which weaknesses are 

overturned and strengths capitalised upon. 

Our most important lesson, however, is that disasters 

themselves should be seen as opportunities for reform 

and improvement. What stands out in this report is 

that governments in all five of the most tsunami affected 

countries embraced change as a core ethic to confront 

this catastrophe. The challenge now is to 

constantly build on and improve these new 

institutional arrangements. Change must be 

embraced, not for its own sake, but rather because in 

a disaster, organisational weaknesses are severely 

tested and exposed. Continuous improvement is the 

only way to ensure all new institutional arrangements 

remain robust and relevant.