Indonesian tsunami expert arrives in Philippines to advise on Typhoon Yolande.

I greatly enjoyed meeting Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (right below) the former Minister of Tsunami, Indonesia, in Manila yesterday morning (14 December 2013) at ILO in Manila. Pak Kuntoro gave an evocative presentation on Lessons Learned that will be helpful to all of us working on the Typhoon Haiyan (Yolande)

Dr. Kuntoro worked very closely with Bill Clinton the special envoy for tsunanmi and together coined the phrases, 'build back better' and 'breakthrough initatives.' Breakthrough initiatives are 'out of the box thinking' that accelerates recovery.

I divide this posting into two parts, the first is a brief background on Dr. Kuntoro and the Ministry for Tsunami he created (BRR) shortly after the tsunami.

And the second part is on:

The Tsunami Legacy: Innovation Breakthroughs and Change

and the third part comprises

Tsunami Chronicles - A must for every disaster or recovery manager. A book written by Bill Nicol

The man behind the rehabilitation of the tsunami-devastated Aceh province in Indonesia is in the Philippines to give insights on managing large-scale recovery programs for the reconstruction of provinces wrecked by Super Typhoon Yolanda.

Visiting Indonesian Senior Minister Kuntoro Mangkusubroto said he looks forward to sharing his expertise and contributing to designing an efficient recovery plan for the Yolanda-devastated areas.

“I’m here to offer the government and the international community my experience as the coordinator of rehabilitation of Aceh,” he said.

Luiza Carvalho, United Nations humanitarian and resident coordinator and UN Development Program resident representative, said: “The aim of this significant visit by Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto is to share ways to ensure that the recovery process in the Philippines will build resilience against future typhoons, lift people out of poverty and manage natural resources responsibly.”

The 2004 tsunami killed approximately 230,000 people, about half of whom were in Aceh.

Mangkusubroto was appointed director of the National Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation for Aceh-Nias known as BRR-Aceh and Nias.

BRR carried out more than 5,000 reconstruction projects and more than 12,500 others involving over 60 bilateral donors and multilateral agencies and roughly 700 non-government organizations.

The UN team in Indonesia was asked to support BRR through training, the development of coordination systems, business processes and standard operating procedures.

Mangkusubroto’s three-day trip includes an executive meeting with selected Cabinet secretaries and the international community involved in the recovery process.

Mangkusubroto’s agenda also includes a technical workshop that will bring together recovery managers from other post-disaster situations.

The UNDP is organizing this important exchange at the request of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

When was resilience merged into risk reduction?

I am convinced that risk reduction as a community resilience concept was put firmly on the global map during the Tsunami operation in Indonesia with Pak Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, then Minister of Tsunami, driving it.

For those of you working on the Typhoon Haiyan operation it is worth reading the Lessons Learned from the tsunami.

The Tsunami Legacy: Innovation Breakthroughs and Change

The Tsunami Legacy report, which Pak Kuntoro presented to Ban-Ki-moon, Bill Clinton and Helen Clarke (UNDP) in 2009 in New York is a brilliantly compiled booklet. I was fortunate to be there with fellow New Zealander Jerry Talbot also from IFRC.

The IFRC have since funded a practitioners toolkit on disaster recovery which will be launched soon in New York.

If you want to read Tsunami Legacy click here

In the years and months that have gone by since

the devastating Indian Ocean Earthquake and

Tsunami of December 2004, the affected

communities – from Banda Aceh to Batticaloa,
Puntland to Phang Nga, Noonu to Nagapattinam –
have seen both tragedy and triumph.

Tragedy, because the destructive power of the

tsunami left countless communities without homes or

livelihoods, eradicated key infrastructure in countries

around the region, and irrevocably damaged large

swaths of coastal area. In all, more than 228,000

people – in 14 countries – perished as a result of the

disaster.

Triumph, because while the disaster wreaked havoc

and devastation on the coastlines along the Indian

Ocean rim, it also triggered an overwhelming national

and international response, delivering emergency

relief and recovery assistance through multiple

partners, funds and programmes. Milestone successes

have been collectively achieved in supporting affected

communities to restore their lives and livelihoods, and

to reconstruct their houses and settlements, all with

care to empower future generations to thrive.

Individual citizens, national governments and

international financial institutions around the globe

contributed funds to the recovery, resulting in an

estimated US$13.5 billion in aid.

With an operation of such unprecedented scope, a

number of useful lessons have been learned across the

recovery spectrum about what worked and what did

not. To take stock of these collective and country specific findings,

this report asks if those involved in this massive undertaking were able to achieve takes its cue from former UN Secretary-General Kofi

Annan’s words – “it’s not enough to pick up the

pieces. We must draw on every lesson we can to

avoid such catastrophes in the future” – and from the

call of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery,

President Bill Clinton, to “build back better.”

“Who Stops to Think?’ The Challenges of

Leadership and Coordination

Both the destruction caused by – and the response to

– the tsunami were unusual in terms of scale. The

unique situation warranted intensive strategic

coordination for the recovery to be effective as well as

considerable pressure to deliver tangible results.

Closest to the epicentre, the Indonesian Province of

Aceh faced one of the most complex situations with a

massive loss of life, extensive destruction of

infrastructure, and an extraordinary influx of actors.

In response, a dedicated body, the Aceh-Nias

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), was

set up in April 2005, with a 4-year mandate to

coordinate all recovery activities as well as implement

a number of government projects.

Elsewhere, in Sri Lanka, the tsunami was a catalyst for

creation of the Ministry of National Disaster

Management and Human Rights in 2006. The

Government of Maldives moved swiftly to set up a

similar structure. On the same day as the tsunami, it

created a National Disaster Management Centre

(NDMC) to coordinate activities.

This development of lead governance mechanisms for

relief and recovery, tasked with coordinating

ministries, donors, agencies, communities, women’s

groups and others, and with building national and

local capacities to manage the process, turned out to

be a critical breakthrough in all these countries.

Carefully connecting the local body to a broader,

global coordinating infrastructure – as was done in

Indonesia via the Global Consortium for Tsunami

Recovery, the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) and the UN

Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias

meaningful development and reform.

(UNORC) – was key to facilitating coordination in a

complex recovery context involving countless

international and national stakeholders. As new

structures, void of institutional baggage, these

agencies also benefited from the ability to be flexible

and quickly adapt to local circumstances.

In India, too, where no new body needed to be

created, the government seized on the moment by

devolving significant authority to local administrators,

a crucial aspect to the Tamil Nadu recovery effort. A

network of state- and district-level knowledge centres

provided the infrastructure for disseminating vast

amounts of information and reliable village-level data;

it also became a focal point for NGOs on how they

could contribute to recovery. The key to coordinating

recovery here and elsewhere was maintaining speedy,

flexible and accountable coordination systems and

procedures, including at the local level.

Recovery partners in Indonesia learned a similar

lesson. By giving the coordination structure full

authority and basing it ‘close to the action’ it was able

to become more responsive to the local context.

Importantly, BRR was given full authority to manage

all aspects of the tsunami recovery in Aceh on behalf

smoother coordination process, devoid of any

potential inter-ministry politics. Significantly, BRR

Headquarters was located in the capital of Aceh, and

not in Jakarta.

Flexibility and know-how, coupled with a culture of

risk-taking, was a central aspect of BRR’s success and

led to several important breakthroughs and

innovations. These included the Tim Terpadu (a one

stop shop for processing all visa, customs, tax and

other clearance requirements for thousands of aid

workers and equipment) and a mandatory Project

Concept Note (PCN) format for all programmes,

which helped avoid unnecessary duplication and

ensured efficient use of funds.

Similarly, when Maldives faced a shortfall of nearly

US$100 million in recovery funds, a number of

innovative partnership strategies were implemented

to secure additional funding. The unique “Adopt-AnIsland” initiative implemented by UNDP, emerged as

a particularly powerful marketing tool under which

donor support could be matched directly to a specific

project. By mid-2006, 44 percent of the US$41

million that UNDP had raised was mobilised through

Adopt-An-Island. In both cases the willingness to be

opportunistic and take risks with “breakthrough

initiatives” accelerated recovery and facilitated

‘building back better’.

In the final analysis, however, lack of local capacity

has remained an issue, throughout. In the Maldives,

the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC)

was set up to coordinate activities in a similar vein to

BRR. But while the Centre took the lead in many

aspects, being new to disaster management it relied

on outside help to a significant degree. And in the

future, it must be remembered that building local

capacity is an important priority if the purpose-built

recovery agency is temporary and the local

Government is expected to sustain the gains in the

long term.

Seeing Those Who Are ‘Invisible’. Achieving

Equity In Recovery

While international codes and principles guide relief

and recovery efforts, many tsunami affected

communities were still unable to adequately access

assistance immediately after the disaster because of

barriers associated with their gender, ethnicity, age,

class, religion or occupation. Often, tight deadlines

imposed by the need to deliver fast had the effect of

dropping equity issues – or of the wrong projects

being taken up by the wrong organisations for the

wrong reasons.

Many people could not access assistance after disasters

simply because of their gender, ethnicity, age, class,

religion or occupation. In particular, it is women and

the poorest whose needs tend to be overlooked. Yet

the tsunami also provided an important opportunity to

address underlying social inequities and strengthen

human rights protection for vulnerable groups, a task

quickly seized upon by India’s strong civil society and

of the central government, which allowed for a much

vibrant media. Combined with a state government in 11

Tamil Nadu that displayed swiftness, responsiveness

and openness, this made the difference in bringing all

survivors back on the road toward recovery much

faster.

As recovery actors in all five locales quickly realised,

there could be no more business-as-usual when

dealing with a disaster of such unusual proportions.

Responding to the initial exclusion, they were quick

to catch up in innovative ways, many employing a

human rights perspective to create an enabling

environment for participation. In India, the State

openness to working with representatives of different

social groups in addressing flaws stands out as

particularly praiseworthy. Authorities in Tamil Nadu

did not simply respond to practical needs but offered

real opportunities for change, through several key

steps.

Breakthroughs in India included the implementation

of disaster-resistant construction and the institution of

inexpensive, 10-year housing insurance against all

forms of disasters. Houses were built for indirectly

affected families who were also given housing

assistance and rights to land ownership. Women

benefited from opportunities for strategic change in

their status, such as joint housing rights for spouses

and funds for the education and resettlement of

orphaned adolescent girls and unmarried women,

amongst other initiatives.

Across the waters, in Sri Lanka, strong emphasis was

placed on equity and the targeting of vulnerable

groups after the tsunami, especially with regard to

permanent housing, road building and highlighting of

issues such as human rights, participation and the

environment. Along these lines, a number of

successful – and flexible – interventions were

initiated, with many partners coming to see the

importance of addressing conflict and post-conflict

issues in the post-tsunami setting as a consequence.

affected in permanent housing under its Unified

Assistance Scheme or had their houses upgraded.

Hallmarks of the scheme included clear eligibility

criteria, management at local and provincial levels,

and significant community involvement.

For equity gains to be sustained it was necessary to

anchor innovative practices in the institutional

infrastructure of the recovery – good intentions can

only do so much if systems are not in place to track

and identify vulnerable groups. Rather than a

piecemeal approach, then, countries succeeded best

when there was a commitment from high-level

managers to ensure equity. In India, a series of

independent equity audits were carried out in 2005

and 2006, at the request of local and international

NGOs, by the Social Equity Audit Secretariat and

trained auditors. The success of the audits is reflected

in the fact that amongst some NGOs, the percentage

of budget that went to directly support interventions

for the excluded rose from 10 or 12 percent to 60

percent.

Building on women’s grassroots activism, recovery

actors in Indonesia, among other things, sought to

ensure that gender issues were considered in all

development sectors through a special unit that

formulated a comprehensive gender policy. UNIFEM

placed a gender advisor in BRR to provide sustained

input and guidance and BRR also employed genderspecific

data for monitoring and evaluation, developed practical

checklists for use in health, housing, education, livelihoods

and institutional change, and promoted active participation

of tsunami-affected women in plans for their future.

Successes in India and Indonesia underscore the

importance of developing institutional antidiscrimination
capacity by reviewing organisational culture and offering
training to staff on rights-based approaches, including
awareness and understanding of gender-sensitive
international codes, guidelines and principles.

Depending on the context, this was not always an easy

goal to achieve across the board. In Sri Lanka and

Aceh, both regions affected by conflict, there was a

need to also address the victims of conflict as well as

those of the tsunami. However, most post-tsunami

organisations largely ignored the post-conflict

context, in part due to donor-stipulated restrictions

government’s timeliness, responsiveness and

For example, the government resettled the conflict-12

on how they could use their funds. This led to

numerous grievances raised by conflict-affected

communities and perceptions of rising inequalities in

aid provision. If conflict sensitivity had been more

widespread and funds not restricted to tsunami

victims only, building back better could have been

more equitable all along. The provision of ”untied”

donor funds that offer flexibility to modify assistance

packages to suit local needs would have enabled more

flexibility to address these issues in a straightforward

manner.

Creating a ‘Virtuous Loop’: Embracing People’s

Participation

While citizen participation is widely considered a

cornerstone of democratic governance and efficient

programming, too often those most in need after the

tsunami were not seriously consulted about planning

or implementation of relief and recovery. Concerted

efforts were made in all countries affected by the

disaster, however, to curb this initial trend. Perhaps

the most valuable benefit of promoting participation

was something that, in the end, is not easily

quantifiable: a feeling of individual empowerment, of

“ownership” of community resources, and the

unleashing of people’s own capacities to cope.

Efforts to overcome the lack of consultation were

particularly successful in Sri Lanka, Maldives and

Thailand, where recovery actors employed

participation by both women and men, through

extensive people’s consultations, beneficiary surveys,

Help Desks and community monitoring of projects.

The Government of Sri Lanka empowered the

national Human Rights Commission to conduct

people’s consultations in more than 1,100 tsunami
affected communities in 13 districts. Although it was

not always easy to ensure community participation, in

cases where participation was enforced, projects were

more successful.

As a result of the thousands of complaints received

during the people’s consultations, United Nations

could provide support to the Human Rights

Commission in establishing Help Desks in each district

to raise awareness among communities on their rights

and entitlements and to follow up on grievances.

In the Maldivian context, community consultations

had rarely occurred before to the extent instituted

after the tsunami. Beneficiary surveys deepened

knowledge of important qualitative dimensions of

recovery, increasing accountability to affected

communities, and were hailed as “one of the most

significant innovations of the tsunami response.”

Thailand, too, made it a priority to give communities

a strong voice. Local authorities took the lead in many

reconstruction efforts and were supported to improve

community consultation, including training to

strengthen women’s leadership and decision making.

One of the most successful such initiatives was the

restoration of indigenous livelihoods in Koh Lanta, an

island district of 30,000 in Krabi province. Taking

into account the traditional livelihoods of the many

ethnic groups on the island, the island was developed

by community mobilisation, savings schemes, and

cooperatives.

Still, it was not always easy to ensure community

participation, especially as some agencies and

organisations sometimes tended to approach the issue

with only limited enthusiasm. Many, it appears,

tacked on consultations as a programmatic

afterthought, and did not approach it as a key

component of the project’s success. Indeed, several

NGOs have acknowledged that mistakes could have

been avoided if a more participatory approach had

been used earlier on. Many had to readjust along the

way to respond to realities and needs on the ground.

A key requirement for these organisations was to

decentralise authority within the organisation to the

local levels. Both CARE and World Vision, for

example, put their field offices in the driver’s seat,

reasoning that they would be best able to deal with the

needs and demands of the tsunami affected people.

Some other NGOs, on the other hand, found it more

difficult to implement effective participation since

many key decisions were being made back in their

headquarters, rather than in the field.

Similarly, the success in the Maldives did not come

easy. For one, it proved difficult to engage

communities in disaster risk management awareness,

given that many Maldivians saw the tsunami as a “one off”
event that would not recur. Critically, however,

the Government and recovery partners were

persistent, even translating basic disaster risk

management terminology into the local Dhivehi

language.

Countering Corruption and Ensuring

Accountability

From the first days of the recovery, then, steps had to

be taken to ensure anti-corruption and accountability

would inform all levels of operations, starting with

the institutions themselves. BRR set out to pay its

employees competitive salaries to ensure that the best

and brightest were not “poached” by international

agencies – and, more importantly, to break a culture

of gift-giving.

To enable complete transparent access and tracking of

all tsunami-related funds, BRR developed a

comprehensive information management system, the

Recovery Aceh-Nias Database (RAND). All agencies

involved in tsunami recovery were required to

send regular updates on funds committed and

disbursed. Complementing the process-based RAND,

a “survey-based” Housing Geospatial Database (HGD)

was created to provide a snapshot of recovery by

verifying and digitally mapping the vast housing

reconstruction sector. The HGD was recently merged

with a third database, covering all other assets –

bridges, hospitals, schools, roads, etc. – creating a

combined information system which is one of the

most comprehensive and “leak-proof” in the recovery

spectrum.

As Indonesia realised, however, good systems will not

deliver ‘on their own’. Accountability mechanisms

need to be client oriented. After being slow to get off

the ground, international and national partners, and

provincial and district governments were contacted to

identify what types of analytical products, as well as

what information and in which format, would be

useful. Then, RAND changed accordingly – absorbing

a major lesson in ensuring participation.

A strong complaints mechanism is equally important.

Early designation of grievance focal points and an

adequate budget for grievance facilitation are critical

for reporting of abuses and corruption, as is

empowering affected communities, including the

most vulnerable, in understanding and using these

mechanisms. Affected people must be empowered to

articulate community claims, actively monitor and

evaluate reconstruction and make their own choices.

Recovery data, however complex it may be, should be

shared in layperson terms to the extent possible.

In Sri Lanka the establishment of an effective

complaint mechanism through local Help Desks (in

response to input solicited in consultations) was a

particular breakthrough. The public could here

question eligibility for assistance, report potential

cases of corruption, or file a complaint. By October

2006, the DRMU had received 17,000 complaints and

successfully resolved most. In addition, UNDP Sri

Lanka set up an AidWatch initiative to enable

communities to closely monitor projects. Such vital

linkages contributed to increasing responsibility and

accountability toward the community and laid

groundwork for continued networking.

Many organisations, notably BRR, responded to the

threat of corruption by putting in place more

With large amounts of cash and goods in motion,

corruption is always a threat during a crisis. But despite

the influx of billions of dollars in tsunami-affected

countries, corruption levels across the board were

kept remarkably low. Key to this success was a

commitment to view corruption, not as a nuisance or

unfortunate side effect of the recovery, but as a core

threat to the reconstruction effort as a whole. In Aceh,

where an unprecedented US$6.4 billion were pledged

for recovery, Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the

Director of BRR, urged the recovery community to set

the bar high: “We see the fight against corruption in

Aceh and Nias as advancing Indonesia’s wider struggle

against corruption.” A punitive focus on “finding

corruptors” would not be enough.

To tackle graft and fraud, BRR became

the first government agency to have an autonomous

Anti-Corruption Unit (SAK) set up to work with

other government institutions, international

institutions like the World Bank, and civil society

organisations such as Transparency International

Indonesia in carrying out its primary objectives of

prevention, investigation and education. Since its

inception in September 2005, SAK has received 1,530

confidential complaints.

What if it Happens Again? Innovations in

Disaster Risk Management

The tsunami has precipitated a critical shift in the

minds of policy makers and communities alike. It is no

longer tenable to view disasters as isolated events and

respond without taking into account the social and

economic factors that aggravate the situation. The

tsunami drew attention to the importance and

urgency of reducing the enabling causes of disaster. In

all tsunami-affected countries, a newfound enthusiasm

for securing the country and community against future

disasters has engendered the creation of disaster

preparedness institutions and policies, new regional

and national early warning systems, and concerted

efforts at promoting community-based disaster

awareness and preparedness at every turn.

Critically, new disaster preparedness structures have

been established in four out of the five tsunami affected

countries and a regional tsunami early warning system has

been operational since 2006, complementing the global

commitment pledged by 168 governments to reduce

multi-hazard risks and vulnerabilities under the Hyogo

Framework for Action 2005-2015.

Thailand in particular has been a leader in numerous

disaster risk management initiatives, and its early

warning system is well-positioned to become a

regional role model. Through ASEAN, the Thai

government swiftly proposed a regional tsunami early

warning centre that would coordinate with various

nations’ early warning systems to ensure complementarity.
It established a Voluntary Trust Fund and donated
US$10 million in seed money to it; additional funding
came from donors such as Sweden.

Thailand was also quick to create a ‘one-stop map

server’, combining databases that previously could not

be used together into one. This clearing house of

information includes high-resolution satellite images,

aerial photographs and base infrastructure maps, all

available at the touch of a button in an emergency.

Maldives’ first disaster risk profile, created after the

tsunami and based on Geographic Information System

mapping, represents another innovative approach to

profile as a key source for development strategies to

mitigate climate change and future disasters,

particularly in developing a “Safer Islands”

programme, which provides incentives for voluntary

migration to safer islands.

Sri Lanka, too, has come a long way in establishing

comprehensive disaster management-related systems.

Organised around 7 key themes, a “road map” has

been developed, identifying over 100 investments to

reduce disaster risk. Under it, numerous innovative

initiatives have begun toward developing a multihazard

approach for disaster management. In addition, the Disaster

Management Act that had been under discussion for

about a decade prior was passed in May 2005.

Following intensive efforts by 29 governments around

the Indian Ocean, a regional tsunami early warning

system has been operational since 2006 as part of a

coordination plan by UNESCO-Intergovernmental

Oceanographic Commission. However, preparedness is

not just about high-tech early warning systems. Community

participation in disaster risk mitigation is also a necessity.

Women, in particular, are well-placed to participate in risk

assessments and the promotion of disaster risk reduction,

ensuring consideration of gender-specific concerns.

Training of a number of community leaders, teachers, local

disaster managers and media personnel has demonstrated

the use of response techniques.

Even before the tsunami, large community-based

disaster risk management programmes existed in

vulnerable areas in countries such as India – where

disaster management. The government has used the

they have been credited for capacity strengthening in

search and rescue, first and evacuation methods that

resulted in saving countless lives during the disaster as

Post-tsunami, excellent opportunities have been

presented for deepening community disaster risk

management across the region, setting up local and

national partnerships. In Thailand, for example, the

early warning system was taken to the local level,

linked with loudspeakers in rural villages and with

more than 100 warning towers along the coast.

The tsunami, finally, brought an increased awareness

on the importance of natural defence barriers. Healthy

coastal ecosystems, such as mangroves, estuaries,

wetlands and sandy beaches, are able to provide good

protection against the force of tsunamis and storm

surges and contribute to disaster risk reduction while

providing diverse livelihoods, sufficient nutritious

food, shelter and access to goods for communities.

Several organisations and programmes, such as

Mangroves for the Future, now focus on the

humanitarian implications of failure to protect coastal

ecosystems. But while most people are aware of the

importance of resource-based industries such as

ecotourism and fisheries to coastal economies, there is

less comprehension of just how important these goods

and raw materials are in terms of their multiplier

effects nationally and locally.

Will We Do Better Next Time?

If another tsunami happened tomorrow, would the

response from governments and the international

community be stronger and better? Can we multiply

our successes, learn from our shortfalls and apply this

in the future for both emergency relief and longer term
recovery?
You only know lessons have really been learned when
you stop thinking about them and simply do them.

Particularly in light of the current global financial

crisis, many believe that whatever innovations we

think are replicable have to be at a low-cost level.

Luckily, the most important lessons we have learned

are not necessarily those that depend on the

availability of large amounts of funding. Effective

leadership and coordination, beginning at the

development organisations alike, can go a long way in

ensuring an efficient and sustainable recovery. And

while coordination and leadership may be more easily

talked about than put into practice, they remain

particularly important in a disaster context where

chaos goes hand in hand with calamity.

respond to the voices of those most affected –

including those normally not consulted, especially

solving the leadership equation. The many delivery

partners who make up the reconstruction community

must also develop the quality and effectiveness of their

leadership.

We have learned that accountability and preparedness

are critical, as is a willingness to take risks and embed

institutional as well as cultural reform amid disaster

response. This must include serious reflection and be

a continuous process through which weaknesses are

overturned and strengths capitalised upon.

Our most important lesson, however, is that disasters

themselves should be seen as opportunities for reform

and improvement. What stands out in this report is

that governments in all five of the most tsunami affected

countries embraced change as a core ethic to confront

this catastrophe. The challenge now is to

constantly build on and improve these new

institutional arrangements. Change must be

embraced, not for its own sake, but rather because in

a disaster, organisational weaknesses are severely

tested and exposed. Continuous improvement is the

only way to ensure all new institutional arrangements

remain robust and relevant.

Tsunami Chronicles - A must for every disaster or recovery manager.

Few natural disasters come bigger than the 2004 tsunami. It left a trail of destruction from one side of the Indian Ocean to the other. Hardest hit was Aceh in Indonesia’s west where the tsunami killed almost a quarter of a million people and left half a million homeless as it smashed into a strip of coastline 800 kilometres long and several kilometres wide. The global community rallied to help in the largest military deployment since World War II, then spent billions rebuilding in one of the most challenging reconstruction programs of its kind. Tsunami Chronicles: Adventures in Disaster Management tells the inside story of recovery. To order a copy, click here.
It lays bare the tectonic political and managerial forces that swept the rebuilding program along with no less force than the tsunami itself, forces that continue to dominate and debilitate other international recovery efforts. This is a powerful, first-hand narrative from a highly experienced journalist, author and consultant who played a pivotal role overseeing Aceh’s recovery then embarked on a global excursion to examine similar recovery efforts in places like Haiti. A series of six books in one,Tsunami Chronicles offers rare and refreshing insights into global disaster recovery that will annoy some, anger a few, excite others and inspire many. A study of management like no other, it will have special appeal to anyone who wants to know how things really work, or fail to work, in a multi-billion-dollar industry riven by the politics of power.

Bill Nicol left, in Geneva for my farewell party at IFRC and promoting his book Tsunami Chronicles to Bekele Gelata SG and Jagan Chapagain, head of Asia Pacific. Photo: Bob McKerrow

Six Books in one

Tsunami Chronicles: Adventures in Disaster Management is a series of six books published in a single volume comprising...

Foreword: A Left Little Toe—introduces Chronicles as a study of the December 2004 tsunami while also establishing the author’s key role as senior adviser to the Indonesian Government for tsunami recovery and explaining how and why it was written

Book 1: God’s Punishment—constructs the platform of disaster recovery by describing the tsunami’s impact on Aceh and explaining the wider perspective of how the Indonesian Government responded to both the tsunami and the ongoing war in Aceh

Book 2: Rise of the War Lords—looks inside the purpose-built Aceh Reconstruction Agency, BRR, to see how it overcame the many political, military and operational challenges that distorted the recovery program

Tsunami Chronicles: Adventures in Disaster Management is a series of six books published in a single volume comprising...

Joy Ching Muller with Bill Nicol in Geneva for his book launch.

Book 3: Consulting in Catastrophe—gets more personal as the author explore the role of technical advisors generally and my own in particular; it provides a bridge between the internal operations of BRR to which technical advisors contributed and the external role of international community from which most advisors came

Book 4: Cultures of Care and Contempt—opens the door on the international community's pivotal contribution to the reconstruction of Aceh while also explaining the bump and grind of working with the global players

Book 5: End Games—discusses the many great fights at the end as the massive reconstruction program was brought to an end in the grip of "victory disease"

Book 6: The Residuals of Recovery—steps back from the detail of Aceh’s recovery to take a broader view that explores lessons, looks beyond to subsequent missteps in Haiti and other places, and projects forward to speculate on the future

Dr. Mukesh Kapial with Bill Nicol at the book launch in Geneva.

Book 5: End Games—discusses the many great fights at the end as the massive reconstruction program was brought to an end in the grip of "victory disease"

Bob McKerrow - Wayfarer

Saturday, 14 December 2013