I am convinced that risk
reduction as a community resilience concept was put firmly on the global map
during the Tsunami operation in Indonesia with Pak Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, then
Minister of Tsunami, driving it.
I was
proud that the New Zealand Government funded a global workshop on 'Promoting Initiatives on Disaster Risk Management' that embedded both concepts of risk reduction and resilience as an integrated cross-cutting initiative to be a crucial part of all future disaster planning and recovery operations, and was etched forever in the
final tsunami report from all Governments:
The Tsunami Legacy: Innovation Breakthroughs and Change
The Tsunami Legacy report, which Pak
Kuntoro presented to Ban-Ki-moon, Bill Clinton and Helen Clarke (UNDP) in 2009
in New York is a brilliantly compiled booklet. I was fortunate to be there with fellow New Zealander Jerry Talbot also from IFRC.
The IFRC have since funded a practitioners toolkit on disaster recovery
which will be launched soon in New York.
Pak Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (left) then Minister of Tsunami, and Bob McKerrow Head of Delegation IFRC Indonesia.
It is worth having a read of the Executive summary of this report to refresh yourself of what was learned from the Tsunami Operation.
In the years and months that have gone by since
the devastating Indian Ocean Earthquake and
Tsunami of December 2004, the affected
communities – from Banda Aceh to Batticaloa,
Puntland to Phang Nga, Noonu to Nagapattinam –
have seen both tragedy and triumph.
Tragedy, because the destructive power of the
tsunami left countless communities without homes or
livelihoods, eradicated key infrastructure in countries
around the region, and irrevocably damaged large
swaths of coastal area. In all, more than 228,000
people – in 14 countries – perished as a result of the
disaster.
Triumph, because while the disaster wreaked havoc
and devastation on the coastlines along the Indian
Ocean rim, it also triggered an overwhelming national
and international response, delivering emergency
relief and recovery assistance through multiple
partners, funds and programmes. Milestone successes
have been collectively achieved in supporting affected
communities to restore their lives and livelihoods, and
to reconstruct their houses and settlements, all with
care to empower future generations to thrive.
Individual citizens, national governments and
international financial institutions around the globe
contributed funds to the recovery, resulting in an
estimated US$13.5 billion in aid.
With an operation of such unprecedented scope, a
number of useful lessons have been learned across the
recovery spectrum about what worked and what did
not. To take stock of these collective and country specific findings,
this report asks if those involved in this massive undertaking were able to achieve takes its cue from former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan’s words – “it’s not enough to pick up the
pieces. We must draw on every lesson we can to
avoid such catastrophes in the future” – and from the
call of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery,
President Bill Clinton, to “build back better.”
“Who Stops to Think?’ The Challenges of
Leadership and Coordination
Both the destruction caused by – and the response to
– the tsunami were unusual in terms of scale. The
unique situation warranted intensive strategic
coordination for the recovery to be effective as well as
considerable pressure to deliver tangible results.
Closest to the epicentre, the Indonesian Province of
Aceh faced one of the most complex situations with a
massive loss of life, extensive destruction of
infrastructure, and an extraordinary influx of actors.
In response, a dedicated body, the Aceh-Nias
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), was
set up in April 2005, with a 4-year mandate to
coordinate all recovery activities as well as implement
a number of government projects.
Elsewhere, in Sri Lanka, the tsunami was a catalyst for
creation of the Ministry of National Disaster
Management and Human Rights in 2006. The
Government of Maldives moved swiftly to set up a
similar structure. On the same day as the tsunami, it
created a National Disaster Management Centre
(NDMC) to coordinate activities.
This development of lead governance mechanisms for
relief and recovery, tasked with coordinating
ministries, donors, agencies, communities, women’s
groups and others, and with building national and
local capacities to manage the process, turned out to
be a critical breakthrough in all these countries.
Carefully connecting the local body to a broader,
global coordinating infrastructure – as was done in
Indonesia via the Global Consortium for Tsunami
Recovery, the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) and the UN
Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias
meaningful development and reform.
(UNORC) – was key to facilitating coordination in a
complex recovery context involving countless
international and national stakeholders. As new
structures, void of institutional baggage, these
agencies also benefited from the ability to be flexible
and quickly adapt to local circumstances.
In India, too, where no new body needed to be
created, the government seized on the moment by
devolving significant authority to local administrators,
a crucial aspect to the Tamil Nadu recovery effort. A
network of state- and district-level knowledge centres
provided the infrastructure for disseminating vast
amounts of information and reliable village-level data;
it also became a focal point for NGOs on how they
could contribute to recovery. The key to coordinating
recovery here and elsewhere was maintaining speedy,
flexible and accountable coordination systems and
procedures, including at the local level.
Recovery partners in Indonesia learned a similar
lesson. By giving the coordination structure full
authority and basing it ‘close to the action’ it was able
to become more responsive to the local context.
Importantly, BRR was given full authority to manage
all aspects of the tsunami recovery in Aceh on behalf
smoother coordination process, devoid of any
potential inter-ministry politics. Significantly, BRR
Headquarters was located in the capital of Aceh, and
not in Jakarta.
Flexibility and know-how, coupled with a culture of
risk-taking, was a central aspect of BRR’s success and
led to several important breakthroughs and
innovations. These included the Tim Terpadu (a one
stop shop for processing all visa, customs, tax and
other clearance requirements for thousands of aid
workers and equipment) and a mandatory Project
Concept Note (PCN) format for all programmes,
which helped avoid unnecessary duplication and
ensured efficient use of funds.
Similarly, when Maldives faced a shortfall of nearly
US$100 million in recovery funds, a number of
innovative partnership strategies were implemented
to secure additional funding. The unique “Adopt-AnIsland” initiative implemented by UNDP, emerged as
a particularly powerful marketing tool under which
donor support could be matched directly to a specific
project. By mid-2006, 44 percent of the US$41
million that UNDP had raised was mobilised through
Adopt-An-Island. In both cases the willingness to be
opportunistic and take risks with “breakthrough
initiatives” accelerated recovery and facilitated
‘building back better’.
In the final analysis, however, lack of local capacity
has remained an issue, throughout. In the Maldives,
the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC)
was set up to coordinate activities in a similar vein to
BRR. But while the Centre took the lead in many
aspects, being new to disaster management it relied
on outside help to a significant degree. And in the
future, it must be remembered that building local
capacity is an important priority if the purpose-built
recovery agency is temporary and the local
Government is expected to sustain the gains in the
long term.
Seeing Those Who Are ‘Invisible’. Achieving
Equity In Recovery
While international codes and principles guide relief
and recovery efforts, many tsunami affected
communities were still unable to adequately access
assistance immediately after the disaster because of
barriers associated with their gender, ethnicity, age,
class, religion or occupation. Often, tight deadlines
imposed by the need to deliver fast had the effect of
dropping equity issues – or of the wrong projects
being taken up by the wrong organisations for the
wrong reasons.
Many people could not access assistance after disasters
simply because of their gender, ethnicity, age, class,
religion or occupation. In particular, it is women and
the poorest whose needs tend to be overlooked. Yet
the tsunami also provided an important opportunity to
address underlying social inequities and strengthen
human rights protection for vulnerable groups, a task
quickly seized upon by India’s strong civil society and
of the central government, which allowed for a much
vibrant media. Combined with a state government in 11
Tamil Nadu that displayed swiftness, responsiveness
and openness, this made the difference in bringing all
survivors back on the road toward recovery much
faster.
As recovery actors in all five locales quickly realised,
there could be no more business-as-usual when
dealing with a disaster of such unusual proportions.
Responding to the initial exclusion, they were quick
to catch up in innovative ways, many employing a
human rights perspective to create an enabling
environment for participation. In India, the State
openness to working with representatives of different
social groups in addressing flaws stands out as
particularly praiseworthy. Authorities in Tamil Nadu
did not simply respond to practical needs but offered
real opportunities for change, through several key
steps.
Breakthroughs in India included the implementation
of disaster-resistant construction and the institution of
inexpensive, 10-year housing insurance against all
forms of disasters. Houses were built for indirectly
affected families who were also given housing
assistance and rights to land ownership. Women
benefited from opportunities for strategic change in
their status, such as joint housing rights for spouses
and funds for the education and resettlement of
orphaned adolescent girls and unmarried women,
amongst other initiatives.
Across the waters, in Sri Lanka, strong emphasis was
placed on equity and the targeting of vulnerable
groups after the tsunami, especially with regard to
permanent housing, road building and highlighting of
issues such as human rights, participation and the
environment. Along these lines, a number of
successful – and flexible – interventions were
initiated, with many partners coming to see the
importance of addressing conflict and post-conflict
issues in the post-tsunami setting as a consequence.
affected in permanent housing under its Unified
Assistance Scheme or had their houses upgraded.
Hallmarks of the scheme included clear eligibility
criteria, management at local and provincial levels,
and significant community involvement.
For equity gains to be sustained it was necessary to
anchor innovative practices in the institutional
infrastructure of the recovery – good intentions can
only do so much if systems are not in place to track
and identify vulnerable groups. Rather than a
piecemeal approach, then, countries succeeded best
when there was a commitment from high-level
managers to ensure equity. In India, a series of
independent equity audits were carried out in 2005
and 2006, at the request of local and international
NGOs, by the Social Equity Audit Secretariat and
trained auditors. The success of the audits is reflected
in the fact that amongst some NGOs, the percentage
of budget that went to directly support interventions
for the excluded rose from 10 or 12 percent to 60
percent.
Building on women’s grassroots activism, recovery
actors in Indonesia, among other things, sought to
ensure that gender issues were considered in all
development sectors through a special unit that
formulated a comprehensive gender policy. UNIFEM
placed a gender advisor in BRR to provide sustained
input and guidance and BRR also employed genderspecific
data for monitoring and evaluation, developed practical
checklists for use in health, housing, education, livelihoods
and institutional change, and promoted active participation
of tsunami-affected women in plans for their future.
Successes in India and Indonesia underscore the
importance of developing institutional antidiscrimination
capacity by reviewing organisational culture and offering
training to staff on rights-based approaches, including
awareness and understanding of gender-sensitive
international codes, guidelines and principles.
Depending on the context, this was not always an easy
goal to achieve across the board. In Sri Lanka and
Aceh, both regions affected by conflict, there was a
need to also address the victims of conflict as well as
those of the tsunami. However, most post-tsunami
organisations largely ignored the post-conflict
context, in part due to donor-stipulated restrictions
government’s timeliness, responsiveness and
For example, the government resettled the conflict-12
on how they could use their funds. This led to
numerous grievances raised by conflict-affected
communities and perceptions of rising inequalities in
aid provision. If conflict sensitivity had been more
widespread and funds not restricted to tsunami
victims only, building back better could have been
more equitable all along. The provision of ”untied”
donor funds that offer flexibility to modify assistance
packages to suit local needs would have enabled more
flexibility to address these issues in a straightforward
manner.
Creating a ‘Virtuous Loop’: Embracing People’s
Participation
While citizen participation is widely considered a
cornerstone of democratic governance and efficient
programming, too often those most in need after the
tsunami were not seriously consulted about planning
or implementation of relief and recovery. Concerted
efforts were made in all countries affected by the
disaster, however, to curb this initial trend. Perhaps
the most valuable benefit of promoting participation
was something that, in the end, is not easily
quantifiable: a feeling of individual empowerment, of
“ownership” of community resources, and the
unleashing of people’s own capacities to cope.
Efforts to overcome the lack of consultation were
particularly successful in Sri Lanka, Maldives and
Thailand, where recovery actors employed
participation by both women and men, through
extensive people’s consultations, beneficiary surveys,
Help Desks and community monitoring of projects.
The Government of Sri Lanka empowered the
national Human Rights Commission to conduct
people’s consultations in more than 1,100 tsunami
affected communities in 13 districts. Although it was
not always easy to ensure community participation, in
cases where participation was enforced, projects were
more successful.
As a result of the thousands of complaints received
during the people’s consultations, United Nations
could provide support to the Human Rights
Commission in establishing Help Desks in each district
to raise awareness among communities on their rights
and entitlements and to follow up on grievances.
In the Maldivian context, community consultations
had rarely occurred before to the extent instituted
after the tsunami. Beneficiary surveys deepened
knowledge of important qualitative dimensions of
recovery, increasing accountability to affected
communities, and were hailed as “one of the most
significant innovations of the tsunami response.”
Thailand, too, made it a priority to give communities
a strong voice. Local authorities took the lead in many
reconstruction efforts and were supported to improve
community consultation, including training to
strengthen women’s leadership and decision making.
One of the most successful such initiatives was the
restoration of indigenous livelihoods in Koh Lanta, an
island district of 30,000 in Krabi province. Taking
into account the traditional livelihoods of the many
ethnic groups on the island, the island was developed
by community mobilisation, savings schemes, and
cooperatives.
Still, it was not always easy to ensure community
participation, especially as some agencies and
organisations sometimes tended to approach the issue
with only limited enthusiasm. Many, it appears,
tacked on consultations as a programmatic
afterthought, and did not approach it as a key
component of the project’s success. Indeed, several
NGOs have acknowledged that mistakes could have
been avoided if a more participatory approach had
been used earlier on. Many had to readjust along the
way to respond to realities and needs on the ground.
A key requirement for these organisations was to
decentralise authority within the organisation to the
local levels. Both CARE and World Vision, for
example, put their field offices in the driver’s seat,
reasoning that they would be best able to deal with the
needs and demands of the tsunami affected people.
Some other NGOs, on the other hand, found it more
difficult to implement effective participation since
many key decisions were being made back in their
headquarters, rather than in the field.
Similarly, the success in the Maldives did not come
easy. For one, it proved difficult to engage
communities in disaster risk management awareness,
given that many Maldivians saw the tsunami as a “one off”
event that would not recur. Critically, however,
the Government and recovery partners were
persistent, even translating basic disaster risk
management terminology into the local Dhivehi
language.
Countering Corruption and Ensuring
Accountability
From the first days of the recovery, then, steps had to
be taken to ensure anti-corruption and accountability
would inform all levels of operations, starting with
the institutions themselves. BRR set out to pay its
employees competitive salaries to ensure that the best
and brightest were not “poached” by international
agencies – and, more importantly, to break a culture
of gift-giving.
To enable complete transparent access and tracking of
all tsunami-related funds, BRR developed a
comprehensive information management system, the
Recovery Aceh-Nias Database (RAND). All agencies
involved in tsunami recovery were required to
register with BRR, set up an account on RAND and
send regular updates on funds committed and
disbursed. Complementing the process-based RAND,
a “survey-based” Housing Geospatial Database (HGD)
was created to provide a snapshot of recovery by
verifying and digitally mapping the vast housing
reconstruction sector. The HGD was recently merged
with a third database, covering all other assets –
bridges, hospitals, schools, roads, etc. – creating a
combined information system which is one of the
most comprehensive and “leak-proof” in the recovery
spectrum.
As Indonesia realised, however, good systems will not
deliver ‘on their own’. Accountability mechanisms
need to be client oriented. After being slow to get off
the ground, international and national partners, and
provincial and district governments were contacted to
identify what types of analytical products, as well as
what information and in which format, would be
useful. Then, RAND changed accordingly – absorbing
a major lesson in ensuring participation.
A strong complaints mechanism is equally important.
Early designation of grievance focal points and an
adequate budget for grievance facilitation are critical
for reporting of abuses and corruption, as is
empowering affected communities, including the
most vulnerable, in understanding and using these
mechanisms. Affected people must be empowered to
articulate community claims, actively monitor and
evaluate reconstruction and make their own choices.
Recovery data, however complex it may be, should be
shared in layperson terms to the extent possible.
In Sri Lanka the establishment of an effective
complaint mechanism through local Help Desks (in
response to input solicited in consultations) was a
particular breakthrough. The public could here
question eligibility for assistance, report potential
cases of corruption, or file a complaint. By October
2006, the DRMU had received 17,000 complaints and
successfully resolved most. In addition, UNDP Sri
Lanka set up an AidWatch initiative to enable
communities to closely monitor projects. Such vital
linkages contributed to increasing responsibility and
accountability toward the community and laid
groundwork for continued networking.
Many organisations, notably BRR, responded to the
threat of corruption by putting in place more
With large amounts of cash and goods in motion,
corruption is always a threat during a crisis. But despite
the influx of billions of dollars in tsunami-affected
countries, corruption levels across the board were
kept remarkably low. Key to this success was a
commitment to view corruption, not as a nuisance or
unfortunate side effect of the recovery, but as a core
threat to the reconstruction effort as a whole. In Aceh,
where an unprecedented US$6.4 billion were pledged
for recovery, Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the
Director of BRR, urged the recovery community to set
the bar high: “We see the fight against corruption in
Aceh and Nias as advancing Indonesia’s wider struggle
against corruption.” A punitive focus on “finding
corruptors” would not be enough.
To tackle graft and fraud, BRR became
the first government agency to have an autonomous
Anti-Corruption Unit (SAK) set up to work with
other government institutions, international
institutions like the World Bank, and civil society
organisations such as Transparency International
Indonesia in carrying out its primary objectives of
prevention, investigation and education. Since its
inception in September 2005, SAK has received 1,530
confidential complaints.
What if it Happens Again? Innovations in
Disaster Risk Management
The tsunami has precipitated a critical shift in the
minds of policy makers and communities alike. It is no
longer tenable to view disasters as isolated events and
respond without taking into account the social and
economic factors that aggravate the situation. The
tsunami drew attention to the importance and
urgency of reducing the enabling causes of disaster. In
all tsunami-affected countries, a newfound enthusiasm
for securing the country and community against future
disasters has engendered the creation of disaster
preparedness institutions and policies, new regional
and national early warning systems, and concerted
efforts at promoting community-based disaster
awareness and preparedness at every turn.
Critically, new disaster preparedness structures have
been established in four out of the five tsunami affected
countries and a regional tsunami early warning system has
been operational since 2006, complementing the global
commitment pledged by 168 governments to reduce
multi-hazard risks and vulnerabilities under the Hyogo
Framework for Action 2005-2015.
Thailand in particular has been a leader in numerous
disaster risk management initiatives, and its early
warning system is well-positioned to become a
regional role model. Through ASEAN, the Thai
government swiftly proposed a regional tsunami early
warning centre that would coordinate with various
nations’ early warning systems to ensure complementarity.
It established a Voluntary Trust Fund and donated
US$10 million in seed money to it; additional funding
came from donors such as Sweden.
Thailand was also quick to create a ‘one-stop map
server’, combining databases that previously could not
be used together into one. This clearing house of
information includes high-resolution satellite images,
aerial photographs and base infrastructure maps, all
available at the touch of a button in an emergency.
Maldives’ first disaster risk profile, created after the
tsunami and based on Geographic Information System
mapping, represents another innovative approach to
profile as a key source for development strategies to
mitigate climate change and future disasters,
particularly in developing a “Safer Islands”
programme, which provides incentives for voluntary
migration to safer islands.
Sri Lanka, too, has come a long way in establishing
comprehensive disaster management-related systems.
Organised around 7 key themes, a “road map” has
been developed, identifying over 100 investments to
reduce disaster risk. Under it, numerous innovative
initiatives have begun toward developing a multihazard
approach for disaster management. In addition, the Disaster
Management Act that had been under discussion for
about a decade prior was passed in May 2005.
Following intensive efforts by 29 governments around
the Indian Ocean, a regional tsunami early warning
system has been operational since 2006 as part of a
coordination plan by UNESCO-Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission. However, preparedness is
not just about high-tech early warning systems. Community
participation in disaster risk mitigation is also a necessity.
Women, in particular, are well-placed to participate in risk
assessments and the promotion of disaster risk reduction,
ensuring consideration of gender-specific concerns.
Training of a number of community leaders, teachers, local
disaster managers and media personnel has demonstrated
the use of response techniques.
Even before the tsunami, large community-based
disaster risk management programmes existed in
vulnerable areas in countries such as India – where
disaster management. The government has used the
they have been credited for capacity strengthening in
search and rescue, first and evacuation methods that
resulted in saving countless lives during the disaster as
Post-tsunami, excellent opportunities have been
presented for deepening community disaster risk
management across the region, setting up local and
national partnerships. In Thailand, for example, the
early warning system was taken to the local level,
linked with loudspeakers in rural villages and with
more than 100 warning towers along the coast.
The tsunami, finally, brought an increased awareness
on the importance of natural defence barriers. Healthy
coastal ecosystems, such as mangroves, estuaries,
wetlands and sandy beaches, are able to provide good
protection against the force of tsunamis and storm
surges and contribute to disaster risk reduction while
providing diverse livelihoods, sufficient nutritious
food, shelter and access to goods for communities.
Several organisations and programmes, such as
Mangroves for the Future, now focus on the
humanitarian implications of failure to protect coastal
ecosystems. But while most people are aware of the
importance of resource-based industries such as
ecotourism and fisheries to coastal economies, there is
less comprehension of just how important these goods
and raw materials are in terms of their multiplier
effects nationally and locally.
Will We Do Better Next Time?
If another tsunami happened tomorrow, would the
response from governments and the international
community be stronger and better? Can we multiply
our successes, learn from our shortfalls and apply this
in the future for both emergency relief and longer term
recovery?
You only know lessons have really been learned when
you stop thinking about them and simply do them.
Particularly in light of the current global financial
crisis, many believe that whatever innovations we
think are replicable have to be at a low-cost level.
Luckily, the most important lessons we have learned
are not necessarily those that depend on the
availability of large amounts of funding. Effective
leadership and coordination, beginning at the
development organisations alike, can go a long way in
ensuring an efficient and sustainable recovery. And
while coordination and leadership may be more easily
talked about than put into practice, they remain
particularly important in a disaster context where
chaos goes hand in hand with calamity.
respond to the voices of those most affected –
including those normally not consulted, especially
solving the leadership equation. The many delivery
partners who make up the reconstruction community
must also develop the quality and effectiveness of their
leadership.
We have learned that accountability and preparedness
are critical, as is a willingness to take risks and embed
institutional as well as cultural reform amid disaster
response. This must include serious reflection and be
a continuous process through which weaknesses are
overturned and strengths capitalised upon.
Our most important lesson, however, is that disasters
themselves should be seen as opportunities for reform
and improvement. What stands out in this report is
that governments in all five of the most tsunami affected
countries embraced change as a core ethic to confront
this catastrophe. The challenge now is to
constantly build on and improve these new
institutional arrangements. Change must be
embraced, not for its own sake, but rather because in
a disaster, organisational weaknesses are severely
tested and exposed. Continuous improvement is the
only way to ensure all new institutional arrangements
remain robust and relevant.
